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Jerome A. Popp, Evolution’s First Philosopher: John Dewey and the Continuity 
of Nature. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007. 155 pp. ISBN 
0791469606, $18.95 (pbk.)
Jerome Popp’s monograph is a part of the SUNY series in philosophy and biology, 
and accordingly is narrowly focused upon discussion of an evolutionary model of 
value theory. As Popp explains at the outset, Daniel Dennett—among others—has 
proposed that any naturalized moral theory must provide a naturalized account for 
its own existence. Popp’s thesis for this work is that, in conjunction with his long-
overlooked insight into the signifi cance of Darwin’s thought to the area of episte-
mology generally, Dewey solved this philosophic problem long ago. Th is emphasis 
upon reconciling Dewey’s work with Dennett’s thought  is reiterated in Popp’s con-
clusion that “It is remarkable how Dewey’s use of evolution in his arguments has 
been vindicated by the current thinking in evolutionary theory and by Dennett’s 
philosophic arguments” (140). In other words, the major thrust of Popp’s analysis 
is toward demonstrating the coherence between the thought of Dennett and other 
contemporary evolutionary theorists and that of Dewey.  
To establish the scientifi c background upon which his analysis builds, Popp 
devotes chapters 2 through 4 to a review of evolutionary theory generally, includ-
ing a discussion of the grounding of cognitive theory in understandings of the 
evolution of the mind, incorporating the works of Dawkins, Dennett, and others. 
Th is section provides interesting reading and an insightful synthesis of the areas 
of evolutionary theory and genetics, ranging from historic sources such as Lama-
Review: Evolution's First Philosopher    105
Volume 26 (1)  2010
rck’s thought to recent works in the area of genetics and natural selection, including 
works of popular science by Matt Ridley.  
As Popp explains in chapter 3, “preparedness versus plasticity,” has generally 
replaced the “nature versus nurture” dialectic in the fi eld. Plasticity, the quality of 
being able to learn from experience, is a concept that to at least some degree in-
forms the entire discussion that follows. Here, as in many other areas, as Popp dem-
onstrates, Dewey’s understanding of cognition holds up well in conjunction with 
more recent developments. Dewey posited “habits” as the outcome of “unlearned 
activities,” and accounted for the development of socially constructed meanings as 
an overlay to innate tendencies. In short, Dewey understood human growth and 
cognitive development as an evolutionary process, even while he lacked the cur-
rent understanding of DNA.
In chapter 4, Popp continues to develop Dewey’s thought in relation to cur-
rent theorizing on the evolution of consciousness and human culture, although the 
majority of the discussion is still devoted to contemporary works. Popp reviews 
Dawkins’s ideas about memes (“catchy” ideas such as tunes, phrases, and fashions 
that propagate readily through social contact) and their social function. He then 
clarifi es that Dewey’s notion of consciousness is active rather than passive—focused 
upon the deliberate and purposeful pursuit of some goal. For Dewey, according to 
Popp, “philosophy emerged when thinking became conscious of itself, which means 
that at some point humans became conscious of their thinking and began to think 
about their thinking” (66). Th is accumulation of cultural content, and especially the 
development of language, may, in the current view, explain the need for the relatively 
large human brain, along with the emergence of the human mind. 
With chapter 5, “Can Evolution Tell Us What to Do?,” Popp begins his analysis 
of the implications for human decision making, including how Dewey’s ideas work 
in relation to the preceding framework. With regard to the so-called “problem of 
the normative” for humankind—the ability, and thus the tendency, to evaluate that 
which surrounds us in terms of right and wrong—Popp argues that Dewey solved 
this long ago, but that his solution has been overlooked and misunderstood. Dewey’s 
position, per Popp, is that the only standard for judging the “goodness” of growth 
for the human mind is in its capacity for continued growth. 
At this point, Popp reintroduces what I view as his secondary—and from my 
educational perspective, potentially more compelling—thesis: that Dewey’s Darwin-
ian perspective has been widely misunderstood in relation to democracy. Th is idea 
is fi rst raised in the introduction; the tendency to give the concept of democracy 
primacy as an independent good in understanding Dewey is, in Popp’s words, “a 
debilitating mistake.” He continues: “To ignore the Darwinian nature of Dewey’s 
arguments is to get the impression that it is his basic purpose to articulate and justify 
a conception of democracy as morality”(xi). In fact, says Popp, “Dewey’s analysis of 
democracy is an attempt to enucleate the social conditions that best open the way 
for intellectual growth . . . thus, democracy is subordinated to growth, which means 
that the value of democracy is derivative” (85). In other words, democracy is the 
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means, and intelligence the end. Disappointingly, however, the results or implica-
tions of this miscasting of Dewey’s thought are not demonstrated or discussed. 
Th e means-ends mode of analysis is carried into the following section regard-
ing situational ethics, still a part of the jam-packed chapter 5. Popp notes that Dewey 
has been accused of advocating a form of situational ethics, then continues:
[T]he counterargument is that situational ethics ignores evolution, be-
cause each situation in which we fi nd ourselves is not unique unto itself. 
One situation grows out of another. Both history and the future, as far as 
we can know either, form elements of the ‘situation’ that is the context of 
the moral judgment” (89-90). 
Th is perspective, focused upon the species rather than the individual or group of 
individuals, is also seen in his comment some pages earlier: “Most of the ethics lit-
erature is focused on the individual and not the species, but evolution is about species 
more than it is about individuals” (79). Th e groundwork for this line of argument is 
laid much earlier in the book, when Popp reminds the reader that natural selection 
takes place on a species level, rather than an individual one. Popp further argues 
that Dewey advocates for each situation to be evaluated not only as an end, but as a 
means to further ends. While this has been criticized as an infi nitely regressive ap-
proach to valuation, Popp believes that this ignores Dewey’s Darwinian grounding; 
regression is halted by evaluating the course of action in light of the consequences 
for continued intellectual development for individuals in conjunction to the devel-
opment of the species as a whole—Dewey’s real supreme good. 
I fi nd this portion of the discussion unsatisfying due to what seems to me to be 
a too ready dismissal of the complexities of particularity. Dewey himself articulated 
his focus on particularity in a variety of ways and over many years, in comments 
ranging from, “Philosophy forswears inquiry aft er absolute origins and absolute 
fi nalities in order to explore specifi c values and the specifi c conditions that gener-
ate them” (MW 10: 43), to “Attainment of the relatively secure and settled takes 
place, however, only with respect to specifi ed problematic situations; quest for cer-
tainty that is universal, applying to everything, is a compensatory perversion” (LW 
4: 182). Th e rejection of value judgments that go beyond a specifi c and immediate 
setting permeates every level of Dewey’s thought, and Popp’s apparent argument 
that situational ethics can be evaded through instrumental evaluation carried out 
at a species level and thus across time and space seems to me to not robustly engage 
Dewey upon this point.
Dewey’s perspective on diversity is considered in relation to the need for in-
novation in chapter 6, “Democracy and Th e Baldwin Eff ect.” Here, Popp furthers the 
case for plasticity, since complex society leads to emergent dilemmas and the need 
for novel problem solving. Th is requires that democracy exist as more than just a 
majority-rules system of government, but as one “whose sociopolitical organizations 
are such that they actively promote intellectual growth for all of their members and 
create the social conditions that support the greater use of intelligence in the forma-
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tion and solution of problems encountered” (102). In something of a passing note, 
Popp proposes that this vision requires a media and a social system of association 
that promote interaction with diverse perspectives, the intent of the First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution. Again, this is a compelling line of discussion for the 
educator, but remains largely outside the focus of this work.
Popp’s fi nal chapter is devoted to an analysis of how Dewey’s liberalism diff ers 
from earlier, pre-evolutionary forms. One section, “Why Nondemocratic Schools 
are Miseducative,” sets out the explanation of Dewey’s preoccupation with educa-
tion as the vital ingredient in his end goal of continued intellectual growth: “He sees 
educational institutions as social structures aimed at the development of intelligence 
. . . and the role of any teacher or parent is to give direction to these [pre-existing] 
tendencies while adhering to the principles of the ethical way of coming at life” (129). 
Popp then turns to the attacks made on Dewey for thus undermining the principles 
of a classical liberal education, à la Jeff erson. Here, as in previous chapters, excerpts 
from, and discussion of, authors other than Dewey are extended, while Dewey’s own 
thought is characterized briefl y, rather than developed at length. 
Th is work provides a systematic evaluation of Dewey’s evolutionary think-
ing that will be of great interest to those working in the history and philosophy of 
science, and especially in value theory. For educational philosophers, as well as for 
educational practitioners, there are suggestions for lines of inquiry into a range of 
contemporary issues; however, given the focus of this work these remain less de-
veloped. Ultimately, also, I was left  still wishing for an assessment of what Dewey 
might off er that remains unaddressed by contemporary theorists such as Dawkins, 
Dennett, and others.
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